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Austrian foreign direct investment (FDI) increased quickly since 1992. The profitability of these 
investments did improve over the full period under consideration (1992 to 2005). In particular 
investments in Central and Eastern Europe became rather profitable. In 2005 total annual 
profits translate into an average return on equity (RoE) of 8.3%. However, returns differ to a 
large extent by regions. They are 5.1% and 9.7% for EU-14 and for CEE-5 respectively. The 
age of investment is the main determinate of profitability. Interestingly, there are strong 
differences between Greenfield investments and M&As. While the latter are always more 
profitable in EU-15 this is not the case for affiliates in CEE. In these countries we can observe a 
time-dependent development. During the first years of investments M&A are more profitable 
than Greenfield investments. However, the latter become more rewarding by older vintages. We 
further examine if profits are either reinvested (and thereby contribute to the existing stock of 
capital in the host country) or repatriated (and thereby improve the performance of home 
countries). The paper shows that patterns differ substantially by countries and over time. The 
share of reinvestment is much higher in CEE than in EU-15. Moreover, M&A show much 
higher rates of repatriation than Greenfield investments independent of host countries. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
The economic and political opening of Central and Eastern Europe
1 (CEE) has had a 
tremendous impact on the Austrian economy. Since Austria’s economy is mainly 
dominated by small and medium enterprises its outward FDI stock (measured as a 
percentage of GDP) has been traditionally very low. In 1992, at the beginning of the 
transition period this share has been 2.1% whilst in 2005 it has increased to more than 
21%. This exceptional boost of Austria’s outward FDI was mainly due to the opening 
up of the CEE economies where Austrian firms invested rather heavily. 
 
As shown in Figure 1 Austrian FDI in CEE increased strongly. Starting from a low of 
1.3 EUR bn in 1992 the amount has increased up to 24.4 EUR bn in 2005 which 
accounts for 43.6% of total investment. Meanwhile this share is considerably higher 
than that for EU-15 (33.8%). 
 



























Further enlargement of Austrian FDI can be observed at the regional level within the 
CEE-19. There we can see a very interesting regional pattern of development. Until 
                                                 
1 Although eight out of 19 CEECs are already member of the EU we subsume under the heading of CEE-
5 Poland, Hungary, Slovenia, Slovak Republic and Czech Republic. Under CEE-19 we subsume CEE-5 
and Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Estonia, Croatia, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldavia, Romania, 
Russia, Serbia and Montenegro, Slovak Republic, Ukraine and Belarus. 
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1996 the four adjacent CEE countries accounted for more than 95% of all investment in 
CEE-19. However, in 1998/99 the picture changed considerably. Firstly, Poland became 
an important host country for Austrian firms and secondly, in particular the recent new 
EU-member countries Romania and Bulgaria as well as Croatia and also Russia became 
important destinations for Austrian investments. 
 
The data show impressively the strong performance of Austrian firms in this region. 
Most of these activities can be explained by geography but also by cultural and 
historical ties. The most recent investments in Croatia, Bulgaria and Romania are 
strongly concentrated in finance and oil processing. Close to 40% of all outward 
investment in CEE is allotted to finance. 
 
Until now not much analysis has been carried out on the profitability of Austrian 
investments (Dell’Mour 2004, OeNB 2005). This paper tries to shed some new light on 
this important issue. Section 2 provides an overview on the determinants of 
profitability; section 3 describes the dataset and provides the empirical evidence; section 
4 discusses policy implications and concludes. 
 
2.  Determinants of Profitability 
2.1. Macro, industry and micro determinants 
 
Most of the studies on profitability distinguish between macro-, meso- and micro 
determinants (for example Lehmann 2002; Lundan 2006).  
 
At the macro level domestic and foreign demand are of primary interest. Foreign market 
growth should be weighted by export market shares of host countries. Additionally the 
development of local infrastructure is of great importance. One can use many different 
indicators for measuring infrastructure development. Each of them has specific 
advantages and disadvantages (Bellak, Leibrecht and Riedl 2008). As usual, factor 
costs, tax rates and host country risks are further determinants of profitability. We 
assume profitability decreases if host country risks decline. Also EU membership   4
should decrease investor’s risks considerably. Finally we should try to capture also 
specific regulations and competition policies of host countries. However, it is rather 
challenging to find the appropriate variables for such an empirical work. 
 
At the industry level sector specific growth rates would be the main determinant of 
profitability. Additionally, one should try to include measures for specific market shares 
of the investing company. However, we are again restricted to proxies in this respect. 
 
Finally, so-called ownership advantages at the firm level should provide us additional 
determinants of profitability. Technological, managerial and local knowledge should all 
raise productivity and thereby competitiveness of the investing firm. Further, 
advertising and a well established distribution networks should also improve 
profitability. Usually most of these determinants are captured by size variables (like 
total sales, number of parent and affiliate employees, numbers of total affiliates, etc.) 
which provide at least some indication on firms’ capabilities. However, this list of 
determinants on profitability will certainly not capture all features.
2 
 
Since actually we do not have the appropriate data to test these considerations we will 
focus on an easier question, namely on the general development of affiliate profitability 
over time. 
 
2.2. The FDI Financial Life Cycle 
 
Firstly, we are in particular interested on the development of profitability over time. 
Secondly, we want to understand more clearly whether profits have been reinvested in 
the affiliates or repatriated back home to the parent firm. Hence we want to test a 
hypothesis which has been developed by Brada and Tomsik (2003) and is depicted in 
Figure 2. 
 
                                                 
2 One issue which can not be captured here is the overall issue of transfer pricing and different accounting 
standards (see Lundan 2006). However, it has to be mentioned that serve problems might arise due to 
different practices in different countries. 
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The theory suggests distinguishing three different stages of investment. At the outset 
firms made an investment in the host country to found an affiliate. At first, due to start-
up problems, affiliates will often operate with losses (Stage 1). In the case of an 
acquisition, this period may be short if the acquired firm can be easily reorganized to 
become profitable. In the case of a Greenfield investment, this period may be longer 
since the foreign firm has stronger adjustment problems to get acquainted with the 
economic and in particular with the political situation. 
 
Figure 2: The FDI Financial Life Cycle 
 
Source: Brada and Tomsik, 2003 
 
After the initial start-up problems fade away affiliates should start to grow and to 
become profitable (Stage 2). However, in particular in this stage affiliates do still have 
strong needs for restructuring. Thus most of the profits might be reinvested to meet 
these needs. As time passes and profits continue to grow, the affiliates may start to remit 
at least some of their profits to the parent company. 
 
Finally (Stage 3), the affiliate has reached a mature stage, the parent firm will choose to 
repatriate a larger share of profits in the form of dividends so that these funds can be   6
used to finance investment opportunities that offer more dynamic prospects elsewhere, 
and reinvested profitability will decline. 
 
Concerning this stylized time pattern the questions arises if there might be any 
differences between Greenfield investments and mergers and acquisitions? With regard 
to Brada and Tomsik (2003) at least the following issue has to be taken into account: 
 
“In the case of a Greenfield investment, during the time taken to acquire a site, 
build and equip a production facility, train workers and begin production, the 
interest on the capital invested may result in sizable and longer lasting start-up 
losses. Thus, in Stage 1, the affiliate operates at a loss and pays no dividends.” 
(Brada and Tomsik, 2003, p.5). 
 
Additionally, it might be the case that Stage 1 lasts longer for Greenfield investments 
than for M&As. However, the main advantage of Greenfield investment might be that 
the firm can be built and organised by most advanced standards, technologies and 
organisational structures. The likelihood that investors use more advanced and up-to-
date technologies is also higher for Greenfield investments. Based on these arguments, 
we would expect that in the long-run profitability of Greenfield investment is higher 
than that of M&As. In contrast, the main advantage of M&A in transition countries 
could be that acquisitions could have been bought relatively cheaply (i.e. below the 
market value). Moreover, acquisitions which have been carried out through the 
privatization process have also included repeatedly large (i.e. former state owned) 
market shares of the acquired firm. The latter arguments would expect a higher 
profitability for M&As than for Greenfield investments whilst the former ones would 
favour Greenfield investments. However, since the above mentioned advantages of 
M&As in transition countries would occur in particular during the first stage of 
investment whilst the other arguments which are in favour for Greenfield investment 
would occur in particular after the restructuring period (Stage 2) we would expect a 
time-dependent profitability pattern which is depicted in Figure 3. 
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Concerning the issue on repatriation vs. reinvestment we would expect that M&As are 
more shareholder-oriented and hence show ceteris paribus relatively higher repatriation 
rates than Greenfield investments whilst the latter ones may have more long-lasting 
interests and hence invest more than M&As ceteris paribus.  
 
Concerning the decision between repatriation vs. reinvestment of profits Lundan (2006, 
p.57) states that the American pattern of foreign investment has been characterized by 
high levels of reinvested earnings that are stable over time while European firms show a 
pattern where reinvested earnings are an important component in some years, only to be 
reversed in subsequent years. Lundan assumes that these differences might reflect 
among others European firms’ agency problems related to their stock of investment in 
the United States, which has grown as a result of extensive mergers and acquisitions 
rather than Greenfield investment. Hence, we would expect that M&As show higher 
repatriation rates than Greenfield investments. 
 
However, all the above mentioned arguments can be examined empirically only. Hence, 
in the next section we will investigate this hypothesized time pattern for Austria’s 
outward FDI for the period 1992 – 2005. 
 
3.  Development of Austrian FDI and Affiliate Profitability by Countries   8
3.1. The Profitability of Austrian FDI 
 
To compare the profitability of Austrian affiliates we sub-divide all affiliates into four 
regions, EU-15, CEE-5, CEE-14 (see endnote 2) and RoW (Rest of the World; these are 
mainly US, Canada and Switzerland). We analyse the development by the median return 
on equity (RoE). The median provides us a pattern of the average profitability of firms 
independently of their size and impact on total profitability. In particular the 
development over time can be traced better by the median profitability instead by the 
average.
 3 


































The profitability of direct investments was not always substantial in CEE (see Figure 4). 
At the beginning of the 1990s, when Austria’s wave of investment in CEE began, 
profitability was rather low, even resulting in net losses. The median of profitability was 
zero for all CEECs. In CEE-5 these initial period of investment (Stage 1) lasted until 
1995. However, in CEE-14 where the first investments took place much later this period 
lasted until 1999. Only then investments became profitable. However, the period 1992-
                                                 
3 We measure profitability by return on equity (RoE). This is net profit (excluding profits and losses 
carried forward) by the year divided by equity (minus profit or loss for that year). Two indicators for the 
RoE can be calculated: Firstly, an average RoE by countries or regions which is the total sum of net 
profits dived by total equity of countries, regions or sectors with aggregate data. Secondly, the median of 
RoE can be calculated with firm level data only. The first measure can be strongly biased by a few large 
(loss or profit) making firms. The second measure provides a more general pattern of the development. 
We have to add that only the aggregate data are free available. The firm level data have been calculated 
by senior officials at the Austrian National Bank by request only.  
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1995 was characterised by a worldwide recession. Hence also investments in EU-15 
show partially losses. However, in this period the RoE in EU-15 was always above that 
of CEE. 
 
In the second half of the 1990s, the picture changed significantly. Profitability in CEE-5 
gained a strong wind and from 1999 onwards it improved to levels far above those 
measured in the EU-15. Profitability was boosted, among other things, on the back of 
the rise in labour productivity (sales per employee). However, the high profitability of 
affiliates since 1996 applies only to CEE-5. The upswing in profitability started nearly 
in tandem in all CEE-5. Three to four years after the initial investment the median 
profitability became positive. During the period 2000-2005 the profitability was quite 
favourable for all CEE-5.  
 
In contrast, affiliates in CEE-14 became profitable in 2000 only. However, since that 
time the median caught up quickly to the CEE-5 median. Since investments in CEE-14 
are more recent ones it is rather interesting to look closer at these developments. At the 
beginning in the early 1990s these investments were relatively small in numbers but did 
strongly grow in the period 1997-2000. Most of these investments became profitable in 
2001, again three to four years after the initial investment. However, since then 
profitability increased quickly. In 2005 the most successful affiliates have been those in 
Croatia (13.1%) followed by Romania (12.1%) and Bulgaria (8.5%). Since current 
Austrian investments in CEE are strongly assigned to these new and forthcoming EU-
member countries the prospects of these Austrian investments seem to be rather 
pleasant. 
 
To conclude, in 2005 the RoE was 5.1% for EU-15 whilst it was 9.7% for CEE-5 and 
10.0% for CEE-14 respectively. Hence profitability in CEE has overtaken profitability 
in the EU-15 by far. 
 
3.2. Age and Profitability 
   10
Since it is quite obvious that the vintage of investment is a detrimental factor for the 
profitability of investments we will look at his relation more thoroughly. Therefore we 
have pooled all observations for the period 1992-2005 by regions and years of 
investment (N = 27275). We can see the strong increase of the median profitability for 
all regions after the third year of the initial investment (see Figure 5). The starting-up 
problems can be observed nearly in parallel for all regions. Nevertheless, these troubles 
lasted shorter for investments in CEE-14 and moreover, the profitability reached far 
higher values thereafter. Hence it seems to be the case that Austrian investors in CEE-
14 may have taken serious advantage from learning effects of the previous investments 
in CEE-5. One further explanation might be that the CEE-14 markets do have less 
competitive regulations and hence are more of a monopolistic nature that those in CEE-
5. Both reasons could help to explain the exceptional profitability in CEE-14. 
 
To conclude the empirical evidence of Austria’s investment supports strongly the FDI 
financial life cycle pattern which has been explained and hypothesised in section 2. 
 




















3.3. Are there any differences between Greenfield Investments and M&As? 
   11
Since we know already that vintages of investments are a detrimental factor of 
profitability we compare profitability of M&As and Greenfield by vintages. Figure 6 
presents the overall comparison, whilst Table 1 shows the specific differences. 
 


















Positive values in Table 1 imply a better performance of M&As, whilst negative values 
indicate a better performance for Greenfield investments. Interestingly, the last column 
(and Figure 6) shows clearly that on average the advantage of M&As prevails only for 
younger investments whilst thereafter the pattern changed into a reverse direction, i.e. 
Greenfield became more profitable. However, we can see strong differences between 
investments in the EU-15 and in CEECs. In EU-15 it is evident that M&As perform 
independently of their vintages always better than Greenfield investments. In contrast, 
in all other regions, in particular in CEECs, M&As perform better only in the fist five to 
six years after their establishment. Thereafter Greenfield investments become more 
advantageous. 
 
One explanation might be that Austrian companies acquired in the EU-15 mostly well 
performing firms (cheeries), whilst in the transition countries the acquired more badly 
performing firms (lemons). One further explanation for these obvious differences could 
be that the setting-up costs for Greenfield investments are higher but in the long-run 
these higher investments leads also to higher efficiency and higher profitability. M&As 
in transition countries might have been acquired by relatively cheap prices and   12
additionally might have acquired large market-shares and hence perform better in the 
early stage of investment. After indispensable restructuring measures where large 
amounts of capital had to be (re-)invested profitability declined. However, they never 
can achieve the efficiency of mature Greenfield investments (Stage 3).  
 
Table 2: Difference of Profitability between M&A and Greenfield by 
Vintages, 1992-2005 (N=27275) 
   EU-15  CEE-14  CEE-5  RoW  Total 
1   0,4   3,8   0,9   3,2   0,9  
2   1,8   6,5   2,8   3,9   2,6  
3   1,3   0,9   4,0   4,3   2,7  
4   1,6   1,1   3,8   4,7   3,0  
5   0,8   0,3   2,0   2,9   1,5  
6   0,7   -6,8   0,5   0,7   -0,3  
7   1,2   -13,3   -2,1   -0,2   -1,7  
8   4,6   -13,0   -4,2   -5,6   -3,0  
9   1,0   -12,6   -5,4   -6,3   -4,2  
10 +  1,1   -6,8   -4,2   -0,7   -1,4  
Total  0,9   -1,0   -0,5   1,3   0,1  
 
3.4. Are the Profits Reinvested or Repatriated? 
3.4.1.  The general pattern 
 
Finally, we want to have a look at the issue what happens with the profitability of 
investments. Are they reinvested or repatriated? In respect to the financial life cycle (see 
section 2) we expect that the share of repatriations will be rather low at the early stage 
of investment but will increase subsequently. 
 
Figure 7 provides a pattern of the repatriation rates by different groups of countries. 
This figure shows two important features. Firstly, the share of repatriated profitability in 
CEE-14 was very high within the early transition period 1992 to 1994. This exceptional 
huge share can be explained only because at that time investors opted exclusively for 
projects with a guaranteed high return in an uncertain period. They were making 
probably quick profits without any long-lasting objectives. However, the numbers of 
these investments are very low. Hence, we can (and should) ignore these three years   13
(1992-1994) for CEE-14. Secondly, at least since 1996 the share of repatriations has 
been always much lower for CCE-5 and CEE-14 than for EU-15. The main reason for 
this might be that by far the largest part of total profits in the transition countries has 
been reinvested due to strong restructuring needs of the affiliates. Only in more recent 
years the share of repatriated profits increased slightly. 
 



































Comparing the share of repatriated profits by vintages (see Figure 8) we see the 
expected pattern for all regions. The older the affiliates are the more they repatriate to 
the parent firm. Firms which are older than 10 years show significantly high repatriation 
rates. Only in this specific age group investments by countries do not differ that much. 
However, the share of repatriated profitability in CEE-14 is always below that one of 
CEE-5 and this one is again lower than that of the EU-15 and the RoW. Also this 
pattern emphasizes that the need for reinvestments to reorganize and reconstruct the 
new affiliates in CEE has been (and may be still is) rather urgent. Hence both figures 
demonstrate that Austrian affiliates in CEE reinvest much more than those in more 
advanced countries (EU-15; RoW). We may finally also assume that these investments 
do not only improve the competitive strength of the parent company but the overall 
competitiveness of the host countries as well.   14




















3.4.2.  Differences between Greenfield investments and M&As 
 
Lastly we want to look at differences between specific modes of entries, namely 
Greenfield vs. M&As (Table 3). Positive values indicate higher repatriation rates for 
M&As, negative ones indicate that Greenfield investments repatriate more. 
 
We see that independently of regions and vintages that M&As nearly always show 
higher repatriation rates than Greenfield investments. These figures might demonstrate 
that M&As are driven more by (short-term) shareholder interests than by pure (long-
term) owner interests (see also Lundan 2003). On average this result holds for all 
regions and moreover also for all vintages. However, differences are definitely stronger 
for investments in CCE-14 where shareholder and owner interest differ most strongly. 
Generally speaking, it seems to be the case that Greenfield investors to reinvest much 
larger shares of their profits than M&As do. 
 
Table 3: Differences of Repatriation-Shares between M&A and Greenfield by Vintages 
  EU-15 CEE-14 CEE-5  RoW  Total 
0  -0,8%  4,6% 5,1%  1,3%  2,9% 
1 3,5%  10,9%  4,1%  -2,0%  4,3% 
2 2,3%  10,5%  4,0% 7,8%  5,4%   15
3 1,8%  4,5%  1,4%  13,0%  4,4% 
4 0,7%  1,8%  9,2% 1,8%  5,0% 
5 3,1%  14,7%  6,4% 5,7%  6,8% 
6 6,3%  10,7%  3,3% 8,7%  6,7% 
7 4,2%  8,9%  0,2% 6,0%  3,8% 
8 1,0%  9,9%  3,8%  -9,5%  1,2% 
9 5,9%  5,3%  -2,0% -0,6%  2,3% 
10 +  5,7%  7,5%  -1,9%  4,5% 3,4% 
Total 3,1%  6,9%  1,7%  2,9% 3,2% 
 
4.  Conclusions 
 
Mainly due to the opening-up of the CEECs Austrian foreign direct investment 
increased rather strongly. This development has enforced Austrian international 
economic activities considerably. Starting from nearly zero in 1992 Austrian investment 
in CEE accounted for 43.6% of Austrian total outward investment in 2005. Austrian 
investments in CEE started in 1990 with many loss making investments. However, 
current investments are rather profitable. Most of the initial investment period and its 
start-up problems are already over. In 2005 total annual profits translate into an average 
return on equity of 8.0%. However, the rates differ quite substantially by region. They 
are 5.1% for investments in the EU-15 but 9.7% for CEE-5 and 10.0% for CEE-14. In 
particular the most recent investments in Croatia, Romania and Bulgaria became rather 
profitable. The vintage is the main determinate of profitability. However, controlling for 
age of investment affiliates in CEE are more profitable than affiliates in EU-15. 
Moreover, we do find strong differences between different mode of entries, namely 
M&As and Greenfield investments. Whilst the former are all the time more profitable in 
the EU-14 we find a distinctive time patter for this development in CEE. There 
Greenfield investments are less profitable at an earlier stage of investment but they took 
over and show a much better performance after five to six years of investment. That 
means that Greenfield investments in transition countries show in the long-run a better 
performance than M&As. 
 
As explained, profits can be used in two different ways. They are either reinvested (and 
thereby contribute to the existing stock of capital in the host country) or they are   16
repatriated and thereby improving the profitability of the parent firm. These two options 
differ substantially by countries and over time. There are once again strong differences 
of Austrian investments in CEE and old EU member countries. The share of 
reinvestment is much higher in CEE. This may be mainly due to larger needs for 
restructuring and expanding current investments. Interestingly, M&A show much higher 
rates of repatriation than Greenfield investments, independently by host countries. 
 
The results of this study show rather clearly the superior profitability of Austrian 
affiliates in the new EU member countries. However, the explanation of this superiority 
is still missing. In particular, it remains an open question if the determinants of the 
extraordinary profitability are micro or macro economic issues. On the micro level the 
better efficiency of the new established affiliates might be one reason for higher 
profitability whilst at the macro level (lower) factor costs, (more) tax exemptions, 
(higher) risks, oligopolistic market structures, (low) purchase prices for acquisitions 
during the privatization process, less developed competition supervision, etc. might all 
lead to higher returns on equity. Hence, further research on these topics is a necessary 
precondition to come up with conclusive policy recommendations. 
 
Without doubt the remarkable profitability of Austrian affiliates in CEE confirms the 
general notion that the opening-up of CEE economies has helped to improve the overall 
competitiveness of the Austrian firms considerably.   17
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